Lowering the bar for Building Safety?
The UK government redefined a Higher-Risk Building (HRB) as 18 metres or 7 storeys and above, diverging from Dame Judith Hackitt’s original recommendation of 30 metres, primarily due to several political, practical, and safety-driven factors that emerged post-Grenfell.

Background: Hackitt Review Recommendation
Dame Judith Hackitt, in her 2018 independent review after the Grenfell Tower fire, recommended that the new, stricter regulatory regime apply to residential buildings over 30 metres in height. Her reasoning was that at this height, evacuation becomes more difficult, firefighting is more complex, and the consequences of fire spread are greater.
Why the Government Lowered the HRB Threshold to 18m / 7 Storeys
Here are the key reasons:
1. Public and Political Pressure Post Grenfell
- The Grenfell Tower was 24 storeys. After the fire, there was intense public scrutiny and demand for broader safety reforms.
- The public perception was that limiting reforms to 30m+ buildings might leave too many at risk.
- To avoid accusations of doing too little, the government opted for a more inclusive threshold.
2. Alignment with Other Fire Safety Interventions
- 18m had already become a benchmark for other fire safety regulations.
- Maintaining consistency across legislation was a practical reason for adopting 18m.
3. Better Coverage of At-Risk Buildings
- Many high-density residential blocks fall between 18m and 30m.
- Government data and fire incident reviews suggested that risk wasn’t confined to 30m+ structures.
- Applying the HRB regime at 18m captured thousands more buildings, increasing the scope of safety oversight.
4. Precautionary Principle
- The government took a more cautious approach, choosing inclusivity over minimalism in building safety.
- This approach was supported by groups like the National Fire Chiefs Council, who argued that risks can still be severe in buildings between 18m and 30m.
Summary
While Dame Judith Hackitt recommended applying stricter regulation to buildings 30m+, the UK government lowered this threshold to 18m+ to:
- Respond to public and political pressure.
- Align with existing fire safety laws.
- Capture a broader range of at-risk buildings.
- Apply the precautionary principle in the wake of Grenfell.
This decision reflects a more risk-averse and protective policy stance, albeit diverging from Hackitt’s more risk-based, systemic reform vision.
The current regulatory logjam could in large part be as a result of this scope change (without corresponding increase in Regulator resource) overwhelming the industry and the regulator. Urgent thought should be given to the complexity, scope and cost of the new regime, in essence Government and Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government need to urgently review PROPORTIONALITY.